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Case Comments
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE
-The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, by extending the rule of
United States v. Wade, has held that an accused who is in custody has a
right to counsel at pre-trial photographic identifications; that evidence
of such out-of-court identifications conducted in the absence of the ac-
cused's counsel is not admissible at trial; and that the eyewitnesses in
question are not competent to make in-court identifications.
United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970).
Over a period of more than five years, the Pittsburgh area was the victim
of a series of bank robberies, all thought to have been committed by
the same person. Such public interest and notoriety attended the rob-
beries and the bandit's ability to avoid detection that the perpetrator
was nicknamed the "Commuter Bandit" by the news media. Composite
sketches of the alleged bandit were drawn from descriptions given by
eyewitnesses, and these were widely distributed to banks and news-
.papers.
On June 23, 1967 William Edward Zeiler, a suspect, was arrested,
and three days later counsel was appointed to defend him. A formal
lineup, attended by Zeiler's counsel and some fifty witnesses to the
various robberies, was conducted on July 6, 1967 in strict conformity
with United States v. Wade.' On August 1, 1967 the accused was in-
dicted by a federal grand jury.2 Subsequently, on June 7, 1968, Zeiler
and his co-defendant were convicted of bank robbery.
During the course of the trial it was discovered that after Zeiler had
been taken into custoday and after counsel had been appointed for him,
but before the formal lineup was held, the F.B.I., on June 29th or 30th,
1967, had privately secured a photographic identification of the accused
by confronting each witness with a series of photographs of the accused
and others.8 Zeiler's counsel was not present at this identification, nor
was he notified of the procedure.
1. 388 U.S. 218 (1967), in which a defendant's right to counsel at lineups was guaran-
teed.
2. Zeiler was indicted for the perpetration of eleven bank robberies, but since a
co-defendant was also indicted on one of the robberies, the trials were severed. Zeiler
was tried and convicted at the first trial on January 23, 1968 of two of the ten robberies
for which he was there charged. He was found not guilty of six and two were dismissed
on motion of the prosecution.
3. Identification witnesses were shown eight photographs, five of them were standard
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At the conclusion of the trial, Zeiler filed a motion in arrest of
judgment, for a new trial or for judgment of acquittal on the ground
that the identification testimony was so tainted that it should have been
stricken from the record and not considered by the jury in its delibera-
tion. This motion was denied.4 The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, by Chief Judge Hastie, reversed, 5 holding that the rule of the
Wade case applies equally to photographic identifications of an accused
who is in custody, and that such an identification held in the absence of
defendant's counsel violated his sixth amendment rights. The court
held that the identification testimony was improperly admitted, and
that the procedure used by the F.B.I. made the witnesses in question
incompetent for subsequent in-court identifications.
In this case the court was presented with one main issue--does an
accused who is in custody have a right to have his counsel present at
pre-trial photographic identifications? An affirmative decision on this
issue made it necessary to decide the consequences of such a decision:
i.e., could evidence of such pre-trial identifications properly be placed
before the jury, and were the witnesses in question competent to make
subsequent in-court identifications?
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that in every
criminal prosecution the accused shall have the right to the assistance
of counsel for his defense. 6 It became incumbent upon the Supreme
Court to interpret this guarantee in the light of modern law enforce-
ment machinery and criminal prosecutions to determine when the
right attaches. 7 The guarantee was construed to apply to any "critical
stage" of the proceedings." A stage is "critical" for Sixth Amendment
purposes if the absence of counsel might prejudice the accused's consti-
tutional rights.9 The criminal defendant is "guaranteed that he need
not stand alone against the state at any stage of the prosecution, formal
"rogues' gallery" dual pictures of men showing full face and profile, all but one bearing
dates, and all bearing data on the reverse side; three of the photographs were ordinary
snapshots of Zeiler bearing no markings on either the faces or backs thereof.
4. United States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224 (D.Pa. 1969).
5. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305 (3d Cir. 1970).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment right to counsel was made applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963).
7. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
8. Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
9. Critical stages have been held to include the arraignment, Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961); custodial interrogation, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); the
preliminary hearing, Coleman v. State of Alabama, 90 S.Ct. 1999 (1970); lineups, United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); the trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963);
and the appeal, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
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or informal, in court or out, where counsel's absence might derogate
from the accused's right to a fair trial."' 0
Thus, the reason the Supreme Court has adopted the policy of scru-
tinizing all pre-trial confrontations of the accused is to determine
whether such proceedings are "critical stages," and "whether the pres-
ence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right
to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the
witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the
trial itself.""
There is inherent in pre-trial confrontations a great potential for
prejudicial suggestion by police officers which often contributes to the
possibility of mistaken identification. If defense counsel is not present
at such confrontations, he faces a difficult task in attempting to re-
construct at trial the circumstances under which they were conducted.
The most he can do is attempt to impeach the testimony of identifica-
tion witnesses at trial,'2 but it is difficult to determine by this method
alone whether there were any suggestive influences present at the iden-
tification proceeding. Without knowledge of the manner in which the
proceedings were conducted, counsel is not able effectively to cross-
examine prosecution witnesses, and thus the accused is deprived of his
sixth amendment right to a meaningful confrontation of witnesses. 13
The United States Supreme Court has not considered the question
presented in the instant case.' 4 The Zeiler court, therefore, relied on
10. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). The Supreme Court has refused
to extend the right to counsel to preparatory stages at which the prosecution scientifically
secures identification evidence. Such evidence can be effectively scrutinized at trial by
cross-examination of the Government's expert witnesses and presentation of the accuseI's
own experts. Examples of those stages presenting little risk of prejudice to the accused's
rights include fingerprinting, Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879 (D.C.Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 954 (1964); taking of blood samples, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757 (1966); and taking of handwriting exemplars, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967).
11. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
12. 29 U. PiT. L. REV. 65, 68 (1967).
13. A criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him
was made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment in Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
14. The Government in Zeiler relied on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S: 377 (1968),
but that case did not deal with the issue of right to counsel at photographic identifications.
There, the defendant's contention was that the pre-trial identification by means of photo-
graphs was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to misidentification as to deny him
due process of law. Simmons, supra, was a pre-custody case, and the court refused to
prohibit the use of photographs in the investigation process prior to arrest. The court
recognized that such a procedure "has been used widely and effectively in criminal law
enforcement, from the standpoint both of apprehending offenders and of sparing innocent
suspects the ignominy of arrest by allowing eyewitnesses to exonerate them through
scrutiny of photographs." Id. at 384. The due process test used by the Simmons court
was whether considering the totality of the circumstances, "the photographic identification
259
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United States v. Wade 15 in holding that an accused who is in custody
has a right to counsel at pre-trial photographic identifications.'0
The Supreme Court in Wade, concerned with the inherent danger of
mistake in eyewitness identifications and the possibility of suggestive
pre-trial confrontations inducing such mistake, held that at least at post-
indictment lineups the defendant is entitled to the presence of counsel.
The rationale of the Zeiler court in relying on Wade was that
[t]he considerations that led the court in Wade to guarantee the
right of counsel at lineups apply equally to photographic identi-
fications conducted after the defendant is in custody. [Citations
omitted.] The dangers of suggestion inherent in a corporeal line-
up identification are certainly as prevalent in a photographic iden-
tification .... Also the defendant, himself not being present at such
a photographic identification, is even less able to reconstruct at
trial what took place unless counsel was present . . . . In addition,
the constitutional safeguards that Wade guaranteed for lineups may
be completely nullified if the police are able privately to confront
witnesses prior to the lineup with suggestive photographs. 17
The main purpose of Wade was to safeguard the accused's right to a
meaningful confrontation of the witnesses against him at trial. This
purpose was to be accomplished by assuring a basis for adequate cross-
examination through the presence of counsel at pre-trial identifications.
It was felt that only if defendant's counsel was present at such con-
frontations could the circumstances be fairly reconstructed at trial dur-
ing the process of cross-examination.
In regard to photographic identifications, one writer 8 proposed that
three types of suggestive influences might arise in the course of the
procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood
of irreparable misidentification." Id.
It is significant that the Supreme Court has been given the opportunity to decide the
right to counsel issue presented in Zeiler, but has refused. McGee v. United States, 402
F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1968); Rech v. United States, 410
F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 970 (1969); United States v. Bennett, 409
F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 852 (1969); United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d
83 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 90 S.Ct. 1096 (1970); United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d
501 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1031 (1967); United States v. Collins, 416 F.2d
696 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1025 (1970).
15. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
16. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1307 (3d Cir. 1970). Wade applies to all
cases arising after June 12, 1967, the date of that decision and the companion decision
in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967), which denied retrospective effect to Wade. Many
cases can be distinguished on the grounds that they are pre-custody cases, or that the
events occurred before the effective date of Wade. In the present case, however, all the
relevant events, including Zeiler's arrest, occurred after that date.
17. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1307 (3d Cir. 1970).
18. 43 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 1019, 1021 (1968).
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proceedings: (1) the type of photographs used could give clues as to the
person suspected by police, e.g., "rogues' gallery" pictures or police
"mug shots" would indicate a prior criminal record, whereas ordinary
snapshots might give the impression that the suspect was recently ar-
rested, or if the witnesses had described the bandit as having a full beard
and mustache, it would concededly be improper to present a series of
photographs which included only one bearded person; (2) the procedure
employed in presenting the photographs to the witnesses, e.g., there
might be seven out of ten photographs of one single individual, or the
suspect's picture might be handed to the witnesses apart from a group
of other pictures; or (3) the police might make suggestive comments or
gestures. If counsel is not present to observe this procedure, he might
have no way to discover the circumstances under which it was con-
ducted. It is submitted, however, that in the instant case such difficulties
were not present.
It was noted by Chief Judge Marsh, presiding judge at the trial, that
defendant's counsel was aware of all the facts and circumstances of the
photographic identification. He not only knew what type of photographs
had been viewed, but he presented them at trial. He knew that the
eight photographs were shown to all the identification witnesses sepa-
rately and without opportunity to consult. Judge Marsh opined that
"the facts concerning the publicity pictures19 of the arrest and the photo-
graphic identifications were fully brought out on direct and cross-
examination." He further stated that defendant's counsel "had no diffi-
culty in depicting what had transpired during the publicity and at the
showing of the photographs; and he presented for jury scrutiny all the
elements of unfairness and unreliability.
20
19. Understandably, there had been widespread interest in the series of robberies that
had plagued the Pittsburgh area for a five year period. A composite sketch of the bandit
had been drawn on the basis of eyewitness descriptions, and the sketch was distributed
to banks and newspapers. When news of the arrest of a suspect reached the news media,
press and television photographers stormed to the basement of the Federal Building in
Pittsburgh, and photographed and televised the handcuffed defendant. He was shown
being conducted by officers from an automobile into an elevator in the Federal Building,
and then down the hal on the thirteenth floor to the F.B.I. offices. Comments by an
F.B.I. agent were taped and broadcast with the photographs over all the major television
channels in Pittsburgh. In United States v. Zeiler, 278 F. Supp. 112 (D.Pa. 1968), the
defendant moved to suppress any testimony by eyewitnesses on the ground that such
testimony was rendered incompetent as a result of the massive publicity. Defendant
attributed the publicity to the arresting authorities. The motion to suppress was denied
on the basis that defendant was unable to prove that the prosecuting authorities either
planned the publicity, or encouraged and assisted the news media in its photographing.
The court stated that even if defendant's counsel had been present, he could not have
prevented the news media from taking pictures.
20. United States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224, 227 (D. Pa. 1969).
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Where, as here, defense counsel was able to reconstruct at trial the
circumstances under which the pre-trial identification was conducted,
and in addition was able to produce the exact photographs viewed in
attempt to discredit the eyewitness testimony, it would seem that the
accused was not, in fact, denied his constitutional rights and that Wade's
purpose had been met.21 It would be difficult to conceive of a situation
in which a defendant could have a more "meaningful confrontation"
of witnesses against him than in the case at bar. Only by the elimination
of photographic identification procedures all together once an accused
is in custody could a defendant be more fully protected, for, in Zeiler,
defense counsel was aware of all the circumstances of the procedure
except the thoughts in the minds of the witnesses. Since it is impossible
to know what occurs in the mind of another, the only solution is to
refuse to allow the witnesses to be placed in a thought-provoking situa-
tion such as a photographic identification. Assuming arguendo that the
role of counsel would extend so far as to allow him to deny the prosecu-
tion the right to conduct a photographic identification, the obvious
problem then would be in attempting to determine the thoughts of the
witnesses during the lineup, or during trial.
Since the primary purpose of police procedures is to safeguard society
by the apprehension of those who would harm it, it must be admitted
that we cannot simply eliminate such practices, and if one could choose
which were to stay and which to go, how would the decision be made?
Thus, if Wade's purpose can be met, if an accused can be assured a
meaningful confrontation of witnesses, the credibility of such witnesses
should be left to the jury, and only where defense counsel is unable to
reconstruct at trial the circumstances of the pre-trial procedures can it
be said that defendant's rights were denied by the absence of his counsel
at the pre-trial identification.
The decision in this case was handed down on June 5, 1970. The court
relied heavily on the fact that the accused was in custody at the time of
the photographic identification, and that this then became a critical
stage of the proceedings.22 It is significant, however, that on August 19,
1969 the same court, in United States v. Conway,23 held that Wade does
not apply in these circumstances
21. Cf. United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969); United States ex. rel. Geralds
v. Deegan, 307 F. Supp. 56 (D. N.Y. 1969).
22. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1307, n.3 (3d Cir. 1970), where the court
said: "However, when as in the present case, the investigation has resulted in the arrest
of an accused, the right to counsel attaches."
23. 415 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1969).
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since these pre-indictment photographic identifications were not a
"critical stage" of the prosecution where the presence of counsel
could meaningfully have preserved defendants' rights to a fair
trial .... There was no form of confrontation here nor, indeed,
was any communication from defendants compelled or their pres-
ence even required .... The fact that defendants were in custody at
the time of the identifications we do not regard as controlling on
this record.24
The Conway case also involved a bank robbery, and the photographs in
question were shown to the witnesses about a week after the robbery at
a time when defendants were under arrest. The court stated that "each
case it [sic] to be evaluated on its own facts .... "25 and its rationale for
the Conway decision was that there was no suggestiveness in the conduct
of these photographic identifications; there was no indication that the
defendants' pictures were in any way emphasized during the display or
that the F.B.I. agents made any suggestive remarks to the witnesses.26. In
a note to its opinion, however, the court recognized that there was a
possibility that one witness, after having selected defendants' pictures,
was informed of the significance of having done so. To this the court
remarked:
Assuming that she was 'told' that she had identified the individuals
whom the F.B.I. already suspected of committing the robbery, we do
not believe this record shows an improper effect on Meyers' in-
court identifications of defendants, though we do not approve the
practice of telling witnesses afterward how the prosecution believes
they have performed in a test of identification. 27
In Conway, the court implied that defendants were not denied the
right to a fair trial because the circumstances of the photographic iden-
tification procedures were developed at trial on cross-examination for
the jury to consider. There is no apparent reason for a different result
in the present case. The court seemed to be concerned in Zeiler with
the fact that the accused was in custody at the time of the identification
-the same was true in Conway; it felt that the type of photographs used
24. Id. at 162.
25. Id. at 163. Two main differences appear between the facts of Conway, and the
facts of Zeiler: 1) In Conway the witnesses viewed the photographs about a week after
the crime, while in Zeiler the identification was conducted almost three years after the
crime; 2) Massive publicity attended Zeiler's arrest, but this situation was apparently
not present in Conway.
26. Id. at 164.
27. Id. at 164, n.11.
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in Zeiler were suggestive,28 but in Conway it recognized that there might
have been suggestive police comments; it held in Conway that Wade
and Gilbert did not apply, and that defendants were not denied a fair
trial, but it held in Zeiler that the rule in Wade did apply in order to
safeguard defendant's rights. The circumstances of the identification
procedure were fully developed at trial in both cases, and yet, the court
reached different results on the right to counsel issue, and in Zeiler it
failed to distinguish Conway.
Six other circuit courts have dealt with the issue involved here. It is
interesting to note that the Third Circuit relied on some of these other
circuit decisions in its Conway holding, but ignored them in Zeiler. In
Conway it relied on United States v. Bennett,29 in which the Second
Circuit in February, 1969 held that the Wade rule should not be ex-
tended to photographic identifications when it stated:
to require that defense counsel be allowed or appointed to
attend out-of-court proceedings where the defendant himself is not
present would press the Sixth Amendment beyond any previous
boundary. None of the classical analyses of the assistance to be
given by counsel, Justice Sutherland's in Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 68-69, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932), and Justice Black's
in Johnson v. Zerbst, supra, 304 U.S. at 462-463, 58 S. Ct. .1019, and
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372 U.S. at 344-345, 83 S. Ct. 792,
suggests that counsel must be present when the prosecution is inter-
rogating witnesses in the defendant's absence even when, as here,
the defendant is under arrest .... 80
The Second Circuit in October, 196931 again held that an accused's
rights were not denied in these circumstances where searching cross-
examination placed all the facts of the identification before the jury for
its consideration. It reaffirmed its position in February, 1970 in United
States v. Sanchez32 where out of eleven subjects photographed, only the
accused was shown with a beard.
28. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1308 (Sd Cir. 1970), where the court noted:
We have examined these photographs. Those of the other men were police "mug
shots"; dual pictures showing full face and profile and bearing police markings. In
contrast, the three pictures of Zeiler were ordinary snapshots; a difference which
could easily have impressed the viewers who were all aware that a person thought
to be the "Commuter Bandit" had only recently been apprehended. Even more
suggestive was the fact that only Zeiler was pictured wearing eyeglasses, as the actual
perpetrator of the robbery had done. Thus, the attention of each witness who focused
on Zeiler's picture as identifying the suspect with whom the investigators were con-
cerned.
29. 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
30. Id. at 899-900.
31. United States v. Baker, 419 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969).
32. 422 F.2d 1198 (2d Cir. 1970).
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The Fourth Circuit was initially presented with the issue in United
States v. Marson,3 but it there avoided the issue on the ground that the
relevant events in Marson occurred prior to the effective data of Wade.
However, in United States v. Collins3 4 it held that defendant was not
denied his constitutional rights as a result of pre-trial photographic
identifications conducted in the absence of accused's counsel.
The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Ballard,3 5 was confronted with
the right to counsel issue when witnesses were twice requested to make
photographic identifications of defendants. That case involved an armed
robbery of a federally insured bank, and several witnesses said they had
seen Florida license plates on the bandits' cars. The photographs of
defendants viewed by the witnesses had the word "Florida" on the front
of each, but the court decided that this was not impermissibly sugges-
tive. The Ballard court held:
We follow our brethren of the Second, Seventh and Tenth Circuits
in holding that Gilbert and Wade-neither through Simmons nor
outside Simmons-require the [sic] counsel for an accused be pres-
ent at the time of any out-of-court photographic identification,
regardless of whether the accused is in custody or not.3 6
The Seventh,37 Ninth3 s and Tenth 9 Circuits have all held in accord
with Ballard. The District of Columbia Circuit40 and the First Circuit41
have considered photographic identification cases, but no right to coun-
sel issue was involved in those cases. Thus, the Third Circuit stands
alone in extending Wade to pre-trial photographic identifications of an
accused who is in custody.
Having arrived at its decision on the right to counsel issue, the court
next had to determine the question of the admissibility of evidence of
the out-of-court identification. It quickly resolved this problem by ap-
plying the per se exclusionary rule announced in Gilbert v. California.4 2
33. 408 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1968).
34. 416 F.2d 696 (4th Cir. 1969).
35. 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970).
36. Id. at 131.
37. United States v. Hoffman, 385 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Robinson,
406 F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1969).
38. United States v. Sartian, 422 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 423
F.2d 1290 (9th Cir. 1970)i .
39. McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1968); Rech v. United States, 410
F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1969).
40. Bryson v. United States, 419 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Mason v. United States,
414 F.2d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States v. Hamilton, 420 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
41. -United States v. Johnson, 412 F.2d 753 (1st Cir. 1969).
42. 388 U.. 263, 273 (1967).
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There the Supreme Court held that such testimony must be excluded
at trial, and that, on appeal, a new trial will be granted unless it can be
shown that its introduction "was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.."43
Gilbert applied Wade's admissibility test for in-court identifications to
testimony and evidence concerning out-of-court identifications. This
was the test used in Wong Sun v. United States44 in which the Supreme
Court said the question was "[w]hether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means suffi-
ciently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.145
In regard to in-court identifications, Wade held that if such identifi-
cations had an "independent source" they would be admissible, and
that, on appeal, a new trial would be denied if their introduction was
"harmless error. ' ' 6 But for Gilbert, the question of "independent
source" became moot because the court there was dealing with evidence
concerning the out-of-court identification that already had been de-
clared illegal. Thus it was left with the "harmless error" portion of
Wade's test. Proof that admission of the testimony was harmless error
was the only way to save it. The same situation was present in Zeiler
on this issue because it had already declared the identification proceed-
ings illegal. The Gilbert court, however, failed to state what is necessary
to prove harmless error.
On the basis of findings in various circuit court cases47 it would seem
that a variety of facts and circumstances must be considered, e.g.,
whether the witnesses had ample opportunity to observe the accused in
broad daylight at the time of the crime so that they would not be in-
fluenced by photographs later; whether the photographs were viewed by
the witnesses separately, without opportunity to consult, and without
any suggestive comments or gestures by police; whether the photographs
viewed lacked suggestive influences; certainty of witnesses that they
could have made an identification without the use of photographs;
whether there was full disclosure at trial concerning the photographic
identification, including meaningful cross-examination; and whether,
generally, considering the totality of the surrounding circumstances, the
43. Id. at 274.
44. 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
45. Id. at 488.
46. 388 U.S. 218, 242 (1967).
47. United States v. Ballard, 423 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Baker, 419
F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1969); Rech v. United States, 410 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1969).
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procedure was not "so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. ' 48
The Zeiler court either did not consider the possibility of harmless
error, or chose not to comment on it. The court simply stated that the
"evidentiary use of the improper photographic identification obtained
after the arrest of the accused and in the absence of his counsel was
constitutional error. '49
The only remaining question for the court's consideration here was
whether the witnesses in question were competent to make in-court
identifications of Zeiler. The Third Circuit, using Wade's "independent
source" rule, placed the burden on the government when it stated: "In
order for such in-court identifications to be admissible the government
must 'establish by clear and convincing evidence' that the witnesses were
not influenced by the prior improper photographic confrontations. " 50
In order to establish an "independent source" for identification of an
accused'it could be shown: 1) that the witnesses had known the accused
personally prior to the crime so that future identification would not be
difficult; 2) that there had been sufficient time to observe the accused
during the perpetration of the crime; 3) that prior to a photographic
identification the witnesses had given a full and accurate description of
the bandit; or 4) that the witnesses positively remembered specific or
unusual characteristics of the accused.
Chief Judge Marsh noted5' that at trial the witnesses in question posi-
tively identified Zeiler, that they remembered distinctive features of the
robber such as his eyes, his mouth and his "look of hatred," that they
were not influenced by the markings on the photographs, or by the prior
publicity pictures, and that they all gave accurate descriptions of Zeiler,
none of which was "at variance with the defendant's actual appear-
ance .... "52 The jury was instructed to disregard the testimony of the
witnesses
[i]f you believe that a witness' identification of the defendant Zeiler
as the robber was a product of viewing photographs of him in com-
bination with photographs of other persons, or from watching
television pictures of him or from looking at newspaper pictures of
him, shown to or viewed by that witness after the arrest of Mr.
Zeiler in June; 1967, and that a witness'-identification of Zeiler was
48. This was the test used in Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968).
49. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d 1305, 1307 (3d Cir. 1970).
50. Id.
51. United States v.'Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224, 228-229 (D. Pa. 1969).
52. Id. at 229.
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not an independent recollection of the robber as she or he saw him
at the time of the robbery .... 53
The Third Circuit, in holding that the witnesses in question were
legally incompetent to make in-court identifications, found that the
photographs were suggestive; the procedure violated due process; the
witnesses had not had ample opportunity to view the accused at the time,
of the robberies; and that the unequivocal way in which the witnesses
identified the accused at trial was irrelevant. It noted also that ".. . in an
atmosphere already so rife with the risk of suggestion, the conduct of
the F.B.I. in privately confronting the witness with suggestive photo-
graphs was particularly irresponsible and could only increase the risk of
misidentification. 54 The court thus implied that in view of the massive
publicity surrounding this case, it would refuse to allow the government
to take advantage of any pre-trial procedure that was even slightly ques-
tionable. Perhaps, in fact, the publicity attending this case was what
actually caused the court to hold as it did on all the questions involved
-- even in view of contrary holdings on similar facts in other circuits,
and its own holding in United States v. Conway."5
Whatever its reasons were for holding as it did on the right to counsel
issue, and the admissibility of evidence of out-of-court identifications,
there is no justification for refusing to admit in-court identifications in
light of section 3502 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968. 5 6 The section titled "Admissibility in Evidence of Eye-
Witness Testimony" provides:
The testimony of a witness that he saw the accused commit or
participate in the commission of the crime for which the accused is
being tried shall be admissible in evidence in a criminal prosecution
in any trial court ordained and established under article III of the
Constitution of the United States.57
In addition to finding an "independent source" for the witness' in-
court identifications, Chief Judge Marsh relied on this 1968 statute in
allowing the witnesses in question to testify at trial.5 He apparently felt
that federal courts were bound by the language of the statute even in
view of its effect on the Supreme Court's ruling in United States v.
53. Id. at 229, n. 10.
54. United States v. Zeiler, 427 F.2d_ 1305, 1308, n.4 (3d Cir. 1970).
55. 415 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1969).
56. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3502 (1969).
57. Id.
58. United States v. Zeiler, 296 F. Supp. 224, 229, n.11 (D. Pa. 1969).
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Wade.59 The legislative history of the act obviously confirms this posi-
tion, as the purpose of the statute was stated as follows:
The use of eyewitness testimony in the trial of criminal cases is an
essential prosecutorial tool. The recent case of United States v.
Wade, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), struck a harmful blow at
the nationwide effort to control crime. The Court held that an in-
court identification of the suspect by an eyewitness is inadmissible
unless the prosecution can show that the identification is inde-
pendent of any prior identification by the witness while the suspect
was in custody, and while his court appointed lawyer was neither
notified nor present. It is incredible that a victim is not permitted
to identify his assailant in court. The same is true of eyewitnesses
who saw the victim assailed or murdered. The fact that eyewitness
[sic] might on some occasion prior to trial have identified the ac-
cused, without a lawyer for the accused being present, cannot in
reason, law, or commonsense justify such a disastrous rule of evi-
dence. Nothing in the Constitution warrants it. To counter this
harmful effect, the committee adopted that portion of title II pro-
viding that eyewitness testimony is admissible in criminal prosecu-
tions brought in the Federal courts and that portion of title II that
denies the Federal courts the power to review final state court and
Federal trial court decisions declaring eyewitness testimony to be
admissible.60 [Emphasis supplied.]
The Third Circuit failed to consider or comment on the effect of
section 3502 of the Crime Control Act. Other courts have avoided it
also. The Second Circuit in United States v. Bennett l said: "Since we
thus refuse to project United States v. Wade and its siblings into new
ground... we have no occasion to consider the effect or validity of 18
U.S.C. § 3502, added by § 701 of the Crime Control Act of 1968."62 The
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Ballard,63 and the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Levi 64 noted, but did not apply the statute. Two district
courts also have recognized the existence of the statute without the need
to apply it.65
59. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
60. United States Code Congressional and Administrative News, Vol. 2, 2139 (1968).
(That portion of Title II that was to deny federal courts the power to review trial court
decisions was never enacted.)
-61. 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969).
62. Id. at 900.
- 63. 423 F 2d 127, 129-130, n.5 (5th Cir. 1970).
64. 405 F.2d 380, 382, n.3 (4th Cir. 1968).
65. United States v. Kinnard, 294 F. Supp. 286, 291, n. (D.D.C. 1968); United States
v. Clark, 289 F. Supp 610 (D. Pa. 1968), where the court stated: "The difficult constitu-
tional issues involved in. this inquiry have been avoided by the government's withdrawal
of these two witnesses." United States v. Clark, supra, at 629, n.26.
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None of the above courts was presented with the type of situation
requiring application of section 3502, as the decisions indicated, but the
Zeiler case was directly in point with the statute. Yet the Third Circuit
neither applied it nor gave reasons for avoiding it, even though it was
aware of its application by the district court.
In light of Wade, section 3502 of the Crime Control Act would prob-
ably be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court unless it chose
to reverse Wade's holding, but since that court has not ruled on the
question, the federal courts are bound by the language of the statute
and must allow eyewitnesses to testify at trial.
One commentator, in discussing the possible impact of Title II stated
that "in effect it is a nullity. ' ' 6 His reason for such a conclusion was
based on the remarks of President Johnson on signing the act into law.
The writer quoted the President as stating:
The provisions of Title II, vague and ambiguous as they are, can,
I am advised by the Attorney General, be interpreted in harmony
with the Constitution and Federal practices in this field will con-
tinue to conform to the Constitution.
Under long-standing policies, for example, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and other Federal law enforcement agencies have
consistently given suspects full and fair warning of their constitu-
tional rights. I have asked the Attorney General and the Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to assure that these policies
will continue. .... 67
It was then suggested that the President's remarks must be interpreted
as a directive to federal officers "to refrain from use of eyewitness identi-
fication testimony that does not conform to the standards required by
Wade, Gilbert and subsequent cases."68
It is submitted that the President of the United States, as a member
of the executive branch of government, cannot, by "directive" or other-
wise, attempt to change the effect of a statute enacted by Congress.6 9
Such a result can be accomplished only through repeal by Congress itself,
or by a declaration of unconstitutionality by the judiciary.
In the case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,70 the Supreme
Court said:
66. Student Comments, Title H of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act
of 1968 as it Affects the Admissibility of Confessions and Eyewitness Testimony, 40 Miss.
L. J. 257, 281 (1969).
67. Id. at 280.
68. Id.
69. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company v. Sawyer, 343 US. 579 (1952).
70. Id.
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In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be
a lawmaker. The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmak-
ing process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and the
vetoing of laws he thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither
silent nor equivocal about who shall make laws which the President
is to execute. The first section of the first article says that "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States ... "71 [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, until the Crime Control Act is repealed or declared unconstitu-
tional, it must be followed by the federal courts, and should have been
followed by the Third Circuit in Zeiler.
William Edward Zeiler has been granted a new trial at which the eye-
witnesses in question shall not be permitted to identify him. The prose-
cution will be left with little evidence in a case in which eyewitness
identification testimony is of the greatest importance, and should have
been permitted under the mandate of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.72 The decision of the court to ignore this statute
seems unjustified, and one would expect at least some explanation.
The procedure used by the F.B.I. here was admittedly unwise, and in
other fact situations could certainly be a denial of an accused's constitu-
tional rights. Notwithstanding the seeming inadequacies of this decision,
however, the Zeiler holding is now the law of the Third Circuit, and it
remains to be seen what this court will do with future cases posing the
same issues.
MARCIA I. LAPPAS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-THE MAXIMUM WELFARE GRANT-The Su-
preme Court of the United States has held that the State of Maryland
may, pursuant to its maximum grant regulation, limit the amount of
AFDC public assistance to large-member welfare families without viola-
tion of the Equal Protection Clause.
Dandridge v. Williams, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970).
In conjunction with the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Chil-
dren program,' the State of Maryland adopted a "maximum grant"
71. Id. at 587-588.
72. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3502 (1969).
1. 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1964) which originated with the Social Security Act of 1935,
49 Stat. 620, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964).
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